华东师范大学(哲学社会科学版) ›› 2016, Vol. 48 ›› Issue (1): 146-157.doi: 10.16382/ j.cnki.1000-5579.2016.01.017

• 公司治理研究 • 上一篇    下一篇

“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费

杨蓉   

  1. 华东师范大学经济与管理学部，上海，２００２４１
  • 出版日期:2016-01-15 发布日期:2016-03-02
  • 通讯作者: 杨蓉
  • 作者简介:杨蓉
  • 基金资助:

    本文为国家社科基金项目“规范垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题研究”(09BJY031)?国家自然科学基金项目“大学治理?财务管理和价值增值的关系研究”(71573090)?上海教委科研创新重点项目“企业控制权?自由现金流和投资行为研究”(13ZS033)的阶段性成果?

“Eight Provisions”, Executive Control and the Perks

YANG Rong   

  • Online:2016-01-15 Published:2016-03-02
  • Contact: YANG Rong
  • About author:YANG Rong

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摘要： 近年来,国企高管超高在职消费现象引起社会普遍关注?通过对2010 年至2014 年A 股国有上市公司为样本进行研究,从高管控制权角度实证检验了“八项规定”对国企高管在职消费的影响?研究发现,“八项规定”对国企高管在职消费产生了抑制作用,不仅抑制了在职消费总额,还抑制了异常在职消费;“八项规定”对低控制权和中央国有上市公司高管在职消费抑制作用更强?因此,要最大程度发挥“八项规定”对国企高管在职消费的威慑作用,国企必须进一步落实中央“八项规定”精神?

关键词: &ldquo, 八项规定&rdquo, 丨在职消费丨高管控制权丨国有上市公司

Abstract: In recent years, excessive perks in state-owned companies have aroused widespread concern. Taking the A-share state-owned companies listed from year 2010 to 2014 as samples, this paper empirically verifies that the “Eight Provisions” restrains the perks by executive control. It restrains not only the total perks but also the unusual perks. The “Eight Provisions” have more power in restraining the perks in lower executive control companies and listed central state-owned corporations. Therefore, to maximize the deterrent effect of the “Eight Provisions” on the perks, it is necessary to implement the “Eight Provisions” further in listed central state-owned corporations.

Key words: &ldquo, Eight Provisions&rdquo, 丨perks丨executive control丨state-owned listed company